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Abstract. We propose a probabilistic variant of the pi-calculus as a
framework to specify randomized security protocols and their intended
properties. In order to express an verify the correctness of the proto-
cols, we develop a probabilistic version of the testing semantics. We then
illustrate these concepts on an extended example: the Partial Secret Ex-
change, a protocol which uses a randomized primitive, the Oblivious
Transfer, to achieve fairness of information exchange between two par-
ties.
1 Introduction
Probabilistic security protocols involve probabilistic choices and are used for
many purposes including signing contracts, sending certified email and protect-
ing the anonymity of communication agents. Some probabilistic protocols rely
on specific random primitives such as the Oblivious Transfer ([13]). There are
various examples in this category, notably the contract signing protocol in [5]
and the privacy-preserving auction protocol in [8].
A large effort has been dedicated to the formal verification of security pro-
tocols, and several approaches based on process-calculi techniques have been
proposed. However, in the particular case of probabilistic protocols, they have
been analyzes mainly by using model checking methods, while only few attempts
of applying process calculi techniques have been made. The only work we are
aware of is [2], which defines a probabilistic version of the noninterference prop-
erty, and uses a probabilistic variant of CCS and of bisimulation to analyse
protocols wrt this property.
In this paper we present a framework for analyzing probabilistic security
protocols using the piprob-calculus, a probabilistic extension of the pi-calculus
inspired by the work in [6]. In order to express security properties in this calculus,
we extend the notion of testing equivalence ([9]) to the probabilistic setting. We
propose a preorder based on the probability of passing a certain class of tests: a
process P is considered smaller than a process Q if, for each test, the probability
? Supported by the Project Rossignol of the ACI Se´curite´ Informatique (Ministe`re de
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of passing it is smaller for P than for Q. Following the lines of [1], a test can
be seen as an adversary who interacts with an agent in order to break some
security property. In order to verify a security property, then, we can create
a specification which satisfies it and show that the protocol is smaller than
the specification with respect to the testing preorder. If this holds, then the
adversary has smaller probability of succeeding with the protocol than with the
specification, so the protocol is correct with respect to the examined property.
We illustrate the above described framework with an extended example of
fair exchange protocol, where the property to verify is fairness. In this type of
protocols two agents, A and B, want to exchange information simultaneously,
that is each of them is willing to send its secrets only if he receives the ones of the
other party. We consider the Partial Secrets Exchange protocol (PSE, [5]) which
uses the Oblivious Transfer as its main primitive. An important characteristic of
fair exchange protocols is that the adversary is in fact one of the agents and not
an external party. As a consequence the behavior of A will be different when B
behaves normally from when he is trying to cheat. After encoding the protocol
in the piprob-calculus, we give a specification which models the behavior of A in
case he is being cheated. We then express fairness by means of a testing relation
between the protocol and the specification and we prove that it holds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce
piprob, our variant of the probabilistic pi-calculus. We present its semantics and
propose a notion of probabilistic testing preorder. In Section 3 we illustrate the
Oblivious Transfer primitive, the Partial Secrets Exchange protocol (PSE), and
their encoding in the piprob-calculus. In Section 4 we specify the fairness property
and we prove the correctness of PSE. In Section 5 we discuss related work,
notably the analysis of the PSE protocol using probabilistic model checking.
Finally, Section 6 concludes and presents some ideas for future work.
For reasons of space, the proofs have been removed from the main text. They
can be found in the report version of this paper ([3]).
2 A probabilistic variant of pi-calculus
In this section we define a probabilistic process calculus suitable for implement-
ing security protocols. This calculus, which will be referred as the piprob-calculus,
is a probabilistic extension of the pi-calculus, similar to the probabilistic asyn-
chronous pi-calculus presented in [6].
A common feature of piprob and the calculus in [6] is that there is a distinction
between probabilistic and deterministic behavior. The former, represented by the
choice operator, is associated with the random choices performed by the process
itself. The latter, represented by the parallel operator, is related to the decisions
of an external scheduler.
The piprob-calculus differs from the calculus in [6] in that it allows only blind
choices. This simplifies considerably semantics and reasoning, while the calcu-
lus remains rich enough to model probabilistic security protocols. Furthermore,
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the piprob-calculus contains some extra constructs, like output prefix and pair
splitting, that are useful to express the protocols we have considered.
We could also add certain cryptographic primitives like the shared-key en-
cryption of the spi-calculus, however this wasn’t necessary in the protocols ex-
amined so far.
2.1 Syntax
Let x, y range over a countable set of variables and n, m over a countable set of
channel names. The terms and processes of the piprob-calculus are defined by the
following grammar:
M, N ::= terms
x variable
| n name
| 〈M, N〉 pair
P, Q ::= processes
MN.P output
| M(x).P input
| P | Q composition
|
∑
i piPi prob. choice
| νnP restriction
| !P replication
| [M is N ]P match
| let 〈x, y〉 = M in P pair splitting
| 0 nil
The distinction between variables and channel names does not exist in the
original pi-calculus but simplifies the treatment of some relations.
2.2 Probabilistic automata
The semantics of piprob is based on Probabilistic Automata, which were intro-
duced in [14]. We briefly recall here the main notions, simplified and adapted for
our needs.
A discrete probabilistic space is a pair (X, pb) where X is a set and pb a
function pb : X 7→ (0, 1] s.t.
∑
x∈X pb(x) = 1. Given a set Y we define the set of
all probabilistic spaces on Y :
Prob(Y ) = {(X, pb) | X ⊆ Y and (X, pb) is a discrete probabilistic space}
Let S be a set of states and A a set of actions. A probabilistic automaton is a
triple (S, T , s0) where s0 ∈ S (initial state) and T ⊆ S × Prob(A × S). The
elements of T are called transition groups. The idea is that the choice between
transition groups is made non-deterministically by an external scheduler while
the choice of a transition within a group is made probabilistically by the process
itself.
Given a probabilistic automaton M = (S, T , s0) we define tree(M) as the
tree obtained by unfolding the transition system. The root n0 of tree(M) is
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IN m(x).P {
m(x)
−→
1
P} OUT mM.P {
mM
−→
1
P}
SUM
P
i piPi {
τ
−→
pi
Pi}i OPEN
P {
mn
−→
1
P ′}
νnP {
m(n)
−→
1
P ′}
m 6= n
RES1
P {
µ
−→
1
P ′}
νnP {
µ
−→
1
νnP ′}
µ6=τ,
n/∈nm(µ)
RES2
P {
τ
−→
pi
Pi}i
νnP {
τ
−→
pi
νnPi}i
COM
P {
mM
−→
1
P ′} Q {
m(x)
−→
1
Q′}
P | Q {
τ
−→
1
P ′ | Q′[M/x]}
PAR
P {
µi−→
pi
Pi}i
P | Q {
µi−→
pi
Pi | Q}i
∀i fn(µi) ∩ bn(Q) = ∅
CLOSE
P {
m(n)
−→
1
P ′} Q {
m(x)
−→
1
Q′}
P | Q {
τ
−→
1
νn(P ′ | Q′[n/x])}
CONG
P ≡ P ′ P ′ {
µi−→
pi
Q′i}i ∀i.Q
′
i ≡ Qi
P {
µi−→
pi
Qi}i
Fig. 1. The late-instantiation semantics of the piprob-calculus. The functions fn,bn and
nm give the free, bound and total names of their argument respectively.
labeled by s0 and if n is a node labeled by s then for each (s, (X, pb)) ∈ T and
each (µ, s′) ∈ X there is a node n′ labeled by s′ and an arc from n to n′ labeled
by µ and pb(µ, s′).
A scheduler ζ is a function which solves the nondeterminism by selecting,
at each moment of the computation, a transition group among the ones allowed
at the current state. The execution tree of an automaton M under a scheduler
ζ, denoted by etree(M, ζ) is the tree obtained from tree(M) by pruning all the
arcs corresponding to transitions in groups not selected by ζ.
2.3 Semantics of piprob
The operational semantics of the piprob-calculus is given by means of probabilistic
automata defined inductively on the basis of the syntax. In order to simplify the
notation, we write
s {
µi
−→
pi
si | i ∈ I}
iff (s, ({(µi, si) | i ∈ I}, pb)) ∈ T and ∀i ∈ I : pi = pb(µi, si), where I is an index
set. When I is not relevant we will use the notation s {
µi
−→
pi
si}i.
The transitions of the automaton associated to a process are defined by the
rules in Figure 1.
The behavior of the choice operator is defined by the SUM rule. The transi-
tion to every member of the sum is possible with a τ action (blind choice). Note
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that all transitions belong to the same group which means that the choice is not
controlled by the scheduler but is made by the process itself. IN and OUT are
self-explanatory. RES models restriction on channel n: actions on that channel
are not allowed by the restricted process. Note that we have split this rule in
two for the sake of clarity: for the transition groups which contain only τ actions
there is no need to check the channel name. PAR models interleaving, in which
each process maintains its transition groups. COM models communication by
handshaking. Since input/output transitions are always alone in their group,
this rule is rather simple and very similar to the non-probabilistic case. CLOSE
is similar to COM but works together with OPEN in order to implement scope
extrusion, that is the transfer of a new channel name between processes. Finally
CONG states that equivalent processes perform the same actions. The structural
equivalence ≡ used in CONG is defined as follows:
(α-renaming) P ≡ Q iff P ≡α Q P | Q ≡ Q | P
P | 0 ≡ P !P ≡ P | !P
let 〈x, y〉 = 〈M, N〉 in P ≡ P [M/x][N/y] [M is M ]P ≡ P
In the following sections we define some relations between piprob processes which
will help us expressing some properties of probabilistic protocols and reasoning
about them. We will also examine some properties of these relations.
2.4 Testing relations between piprob processes
Testing is a well-known method of comparing processes, resulting in equivalences
weaker than the ones of the bisimulation family. The idea, proposed by De Nicola
and Hennessy ([9]), is that two processes are equivalent if they both pass the
same set of tests. A test is a process running in parallel with the one being
tested and which can perform a distinguished action ω which represents success.
This idea is very useful for the analysis of security protocols, as suggested in [1],
since a test can be seen as an adversary who interferes with a communication
agent and declares his success with an ω action. Then two processes are testing
equivalent if they are vulnerable to the same attacks.
In the probabilistic setting there are different approaches for defining test-
ing equivalence. For example [12] proposes a probabilistic extension of testing
equivalence which considers the ability of each process to pass a test with non-
zero probability (may testing) or probability one (must testing). However, when
analyzing security protocols we are not only interested in the ability of passing
a test, but also in the exact probability of success. Thus our definition resembles
more to the one of [7] and the result is no longer an equivalence but a preorder.
We start by defining the probability of a set of executions. Given a probabilis-
tic automaton M and a scheduler ζ, an execution fragment ξ is a path (finite or
infinite) from the root of etree(M, ζ). The probability of an execution fragment
ξ = n0
µ0
−→
p0
n1
µ1
−→
p1
n2
µ2
−→
p2
. . . is defined as pb(ξ) =
∏
i pi. An execution is a
maximal execution fragment. The set of all executions of M under ζ is denoted
by exec(M, ζ).
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Given an execution fragment ξ, a cone with prefix ξ is defined as Cξ = {ξ
′ ∈
exec(M, ζ) | ξ ≤ ξ′} where ≤ is the prefix relation. We define pb(Cξ) = pb(ξ).
Let {Ci}i∈I be a countable set of disjoint cones. We define pb(
⋃
i∈I Ci) =∑
i∈I pb(Ci). We can show that this probability is well defined, that is two dif-
ferent sets of disjoint cones with the same union give the same probability.
A test O is a piprob-calculus process able to perform a distinguished action ω.
An interaction between O and a process P is a sequence of τ transitions starting
from P |O. In order to allow only τ actions we define νP = νn1 . . . νnkP , where
n1, . . . , nk are all the free names in P . Then an interaction between P and O is
an element of exec(ν(P |O), ζ)1:
ν(P |O) = Q0
τ
−→
p0
Q1
τ
−→
p1
Q2
τ
−→
p2
. . .
An interaction ξ is successful if Qi
ω
−→
p
for some i. Let sexec(ν(P |O), ζ) = {ξ ∈
exec(ν(P |O), ζ) | ξ is successful}. This set can be obtained as a countable union
of disjoint cones [6], so the probability of a successful execution can be defined
as pb(sexec(ν(P |O), ζ)).
We now define the upper and lower probability for P to pass O.
Definition 1. Let P be a process and O a test. We define
P dOe = sup{pb(sexec(ν(P | O), ζ)) | ζ is a scheduler}
P bOc = inf{pb(sexec(ν(P | O), ζ)) | ζ is a scheduler}
Then we define the testing preorders for piprob-processes.
Definition 2. Let P, Q be processes. We define must and may-testing preorders
as follows:
P v may Q iff for all tests O : P dOe ≤ QdOe
P v must Q iff for all tests O : P bOc ≤ QbOc
In this paper we will only use may-testing to express safety properties of
security protocols, so we will write just v for v may .
As we will see in the following sections, an agent of a probabilistic security
protocol behaves differently when his partner deviates from the protocol in an
attempt to cheat. In order to model this behavior we introduce a conditional
testing preorder, which is exactly the same as may-testing except that it only
considers tests that satisfy a certain condition.
Definition 3. Let P, Q be processes. We define the conditional may-testing pre-
order as follows:
P vφ Q iff for all tests O : φ(O) ⇒ P dOe ≤ QdOe
where φ(O) is a condition on O.
1 With a slight abuse of notation we will sometimes use a process to denote its corre-
sponding probabilistic automaton.
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Finally we define a useful preorder between pairs of processes:
Definition 4. Let P1, P2, Q1, Q2 be processes. We define the relation vp between
pairs of processes as follows
(P1, P2) vp (Q1, Q2) iff P1 +p P2 v Q1 +p Q2
where P1 +p P2 stands for
∑2
i=1 piPi with p1 = p and p2 = 1− p.
2.5 Properties of testing preorders
In this section we examine some properties of the previously defined relations.
We present only the corresponding lemmas, all proofs can be found in [3].
The following lemma is very useful for reasoning about the upper probability
of passing a test. It crucially relies on the fact that in piprob probabilistic choices
are blind.
Lemma 1. Let P, Q be piprob processes and p ∈ [0, 1]. Then for all tests O
P +p QdOe = pP dOe+ (1− p)QdOe
A context C is a process containing a “hole”. We will denote by C[P ] the
process obtained by replacing the hole in C by P . A preorder is a precongruence
if it is closed under any context.
May-testing is not a precongruence on arbitrary processes since for P =
[x is y]P ′, Q = [x is z]Q′, C = n(x).[ ], we have P v Q but C[P ] v C[Q] does
not hold for all P ′, Q′. However all previous relations become precongruences if
we restrict to closed processes.
Definition 5. A process is called closed if it contains no free variables.
Remark 1. Because of the distinction between variables and channel names, a
closed process can still have free channel names and therefore be able to com-
municate with the environment.
Lemma 2. vp is a precongruence on closed processes, that is for all contexts C
and all closed processes P1, P2, Q1, Q2
(P1, P2) vp (Q1, Q2) ⇒ (C[P1], C[P2]) vp (C[Q1], C[Q2])
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of lemmas 1 and 2.
Corollary 1. v is a precongruence on closed processes.
3 Probabilistic Security Protocols
In this section we discuss probabilistic security protocols based on the Oblivious
Transfer and we show how to model them using the piprob-calculus.
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3.1 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer
The Oblivious Transfer is a primitive operation used in various probabilistic
security protocols. In this particular version a sender A sends exactly one of the
messages M1, M2 to a receiver B. The latter receives i and Mi where i is 1 or 2,
each with probability 1/2. Moreover A should get no information about which
message was received by B. More precisely the protocol OT 1
2
(A, B, M1, M2)
should satisfy the following conditions:
1. If A executes OT 1
2
(A, B, M1, M2) properly then B receives exactly one mes-
sage, (1, M1) or (2, M2), each with probability 1/2.
2. After the execution of OT 1
2
(A, B, M1, M2), if it is properly executed, for A
the probability that B got Mi remains 1/2.
3. If A deviates from the protocol, in order to increase his probability of learning
what B received, then B can detect his attempt with probability at least
1/2.
It is worth noting that in the literature the reception of the index i by B is
often not mentioned, at least not explicitly ([5]). However, omitting the index
can lead to possible attacks. Consider the case where A executes (properly)
OT 1
2
(M1, M1). Then B will receive M1 with probability one, but he cannot
distinguish it from the case where he receives M1 as a result of OT 12 (M1, M2).
So A is forcing B to receive M1. We will see that, in the case of the PSE
protocol, A could exploit this situation in order to get an unfair advantage.
Note that the condition 3 does not apply to this situation since this cannot be
considered as a deviation from the Oblivious Transfer. A generic implementation
of the Oblivious Transfer could not detect such behavior since A executes OT
properly, the problem lies only in the data being transfered.
Using the indexes, however, solves the problem since B will receive (2, M1)
with probability one half. This is distinguishable from any outcome of OT 1
2
(M1,
M1) so, in the case of PSE, B could detect that he’s being cheated. Implemen-
tations of the Oblivious Transfer do provide the index information, even though
sometimes it is not mentioned ([5]). In other formulations of the OT the re-
ceiver can actually select which message he wants to receive, so this problem is
irrelevant.
Encoding in the piprob-calculus. The Oblivious Transfer can be implemented in
the piprob-calculus, using the probabilistic choice operator. In order to make it
impossible to cheat, a server process is used to coordinate the transfer. The
processes of the sender and the server are the following:
OT 1
2
(m1, m2, cas)
∆
= casm1.casm2.0
S(cas, csb)
∆
= cas(m1).cas(m2).(cbs〈1, m1〉+0.5 cbs〈2, m2〉)
where m1, m2 are the names to be sent. cas is a channel private to A and S and
csb a channel private to B and S. Each agent communicates only with the server
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PSE (A, B, {ai}i, {bi}i) {
for i = 1 to n do
OT 1
2
(A,B, ai, ai+n)
OT 1
2
(B, A, bi, bi+n)
next
for j = 1 to m do
for i = 1 to 2n do
A sends jth bit of ai to B
for i = 1 to 2n do
B sends jth bit of bi to B
next
}
Fig. 2. Partial Secrets Exchange protocol
and not directly with the other agent. B receives the message from the server
(which should be in parallel with A and B) by making an input action on csb.
It is easy to see that these processes correctly implement the Oblivious Trans-
fer. The only requirement is that A should not contain csb, so that he can only
communicate with B through the server.
3.2 Partial Secrets Exchange Protocol
This protocol is the core of three probabilistic protocols for contract signing,
certified email and coin tossing, all presented in [5]. It involves two agents, each
having 2n secrets split in pairs, (a1, an+1), ..., (an, a2n) for A and (b1, bn+1), ...,
(bn, b2n) for B. Each secret consists of m bits. The purpose is to exchange a
single pair of secrets under the constraint that, if at a specific time B has one
of A’s pairs, then with high probability A should also have one of B’s pairs and
vice versa.
The protocol, displayed in figure 2, consists of two parts. During the first A
and B exchange their pairs of secrets using OT 1
2
. After this step A knows exactly
one half of each of B’s pairs and vice versa. During the second part, all secrets
are exchanged bit per bit. Half of the bits received are already known from the
first step, so both agents can check whether they are valid. Obviously, if both A
and B execute the protocol properly then all secrets are revealed.
The problem arises when B tries to cheat and sends incorrectly some of his
secrets. In this case it can be proved that with high probability some of the
tests of A will fail causing A to stop the execution of the protocol and avoid
revealing his secrets. The idea is that, in order for B to cheat, he must send at
least one half of each of his pairs incorrectly. However he cannot know which of
the two halves is already received by A during the first part of the protocol. So
a pair sent incorrectly will have only one half probability of being accepted by
A, leading to a total 2−n probability of success.
Now imagine, as discussed in section 3.1, that B executes OT 1
2
(B, A, bi, bi),
thus forcing A to receive bi. Now, in the second part, he can send all {bi+n | 1 ≤
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i ≤ n} incorrectly without failing any test. Moreover A cannot detect this situ-
ation. If indexes are available A will receive (2, bi+n) with probability one half
and since he knows that bi+n is not the second half of the corresponding pair he
will stop the protocol.
Encoding in the piprob-calculus. In this paragraph we present an encoding of the
PSE protocol in the piprob-calculus. Before giving the corresponding process there
are two points worth discussing.
– The secrets exchanged by PSE should be recognizable, which means that
agent A cannot compute B’s secrets, but he can recognize them when he
receives them. Of course a secret can be recognized only as a whole, no single
bit can be recognized by itself. To implement this feature we allow B’s secrets
to appear in A’s process, as if A knew them. However we allow a secret to
appear only as a whole (not decomposed) and only inside a test construct,
which means that it can only be used to recognize another message.
– In our analysis we need to detect the fact that an agent sends a specific bit
in a certain position of a specific message. Thus, in the implementation of
PSE, each parameter aij (resp. bij) is considered to take values from the
domain {0ij , 1ij}, where 0ij (resp. 1ij) is a public channel but different for
each i, j.
Note that having secrets composed by public bits can lead to guessing attacks
by non-deterministic adversaries. Many analysis tools for security protocols,
such as the spi-calculus, do not allow the decomposition of secrets to avoid
such guesses. In our analysis, however, we express the correctness of a pro-
tocol as the equivalence with a properly constructed specification. This only
proves that the protocol will not reveal any secrets and is not related with
the adversary’s ability of guessing the secrets without interfering with any
partner (of course, this is known to happen with very small probability).
Such attacks will apply to both the protocol and the specification.
The encoding for the general case of n pairs and m bits per message is
displayed in figure 3. We denote by ai (resp. bi) the i-th secret of A (resp. B)
and by aij (resp. bij) the j-th bit of ai (resp. bi). ri is the i-th message received
by Oblivious Transfer and ki is the corresponding index.
The first part consists of the first 3 lines of the process definition. In this part
A sends his pairs using OT 1
2
, receives the ones of B and decomposes them. To
check the received messages A starts a loop of n steps, each of whom is guarded
by an input action on qi for synchronization. During the i-th step, ri is tested
against bi or bi+n depending on the outcome of the OT, that is on the value of
ki.
The second part consists of a loop of m steps, each of whom is guarded by
an input action on sj . During each step the j-th bit of each secret is sent and
the corresponding bits of B are received in dij . Then there is nested loop of n
tests controlled by the input actions on ti. Each test, performed by the Test
subprocess, ensures that B’s bits are valid. Test(i, j) checks the j-th bit of the
10
A({aij}i=1..2n,j=1..m , {bi}i=1..2n)
∆
=Qn
i=1 OT
1
2
(〈ai1, . . . , aim〉, 〈a(i+n)1, . . . , a(i+n)m〉, casi ) |
csa1 (〈k1, r1〉).let 〈r11, . . . , r1m〉 = r1 in . . . csan(〈kn, rn〉).let 〈rn1, . . . , rnm〉 = rn in
νq1 . . . νqn+1(q1 ? |
Qn
i=1 qi(x).T estOT (i) |
qn+1(x).νs1 . . . νsm+1(s1 ? |Qm
j=1 sj(x).cpa1j . . . . cpa(2n)j .cp(d1j). . . . cp(d(2n)j).
νt1 . . . νtn+1(t1 ? |
Qn
i=1 ti(x).T est(i, j) | tn+1(x).sj+1?) |
sm+1(x).cpok))
TestOT (i)
∆
= ([ki is 1][ri is bi]qi+1 ? | [ki is 2][ri is bi+n]qi+1?)
Test(i, j)
∆
= ([ki is 1][rij is dij ]ti+1 ? | [ki is 2][rij is d(i+n)j ]ti+1?)
Fig. 3. Encoding of PSE protocol
i-th pair. The bit received during the first part, namely rij , is compared to dij or
d(i+n)j depending on ki. If the bit is valid, an output action on ti+j is performed
to continue to the next test.
Finally, an instance of the protocol is an agent A put in parallel with servers
for all oblivious transfers:
I
∆
= A({aij}i=1..2n,j=1..m, {bi}i=1..2n) |
n∏
i=1
(S(casi , csbi) | S(cbsi , csai))
4 Verification of Security Properties
A well known method for expressing and proving security properties using pro-
cess calculi is by means of specifications. A specification Pspec of a protocol P
is a process which is simple enough in order to prove (or accept) that it models
the correct behavior of the protocol. Then the correctness of P is implied by
P ' Pspec where ' is a testing equivalence. The idea is that, if there exists an
attack for P , this attack can be modeled by a test O which performs the attack
and outputs ω if it succeeds. Then P should pass the test and since P ' Pspec,
Pspec should also pass it, which is a contradiction (no attack exists for Pspec).
However, in case of probabilistic protocols, attacks do exist but only succeed
with a very small probability. So examining only the ability of passing a test is
not sufficient since the fact that Pspec has an attack is no longer contradictory.
Instead we will use a specification which can be shown to have very small prob-
ability of been attacked and we will express the correctness of P as P v Pspec
where v is the testing preorder defined in section 2.4. Then an attack of high
probability for P should be applicable with at least the same probability for
Pspec which is contradictory.
11
4.1 A specification for PSE
Let us recall the fairness property for the PSE protocol.
If B receives one of A’s pairs then with high probability A should also
be able to receive one of B’s pairs.
First of all we must point out two important differences between this type of
protocols and the traditional cryptographic ones.
– In traditional protocols both A and B are considered honest. The purpose of
the protocol is to ensure that no outside adversary can access the messages
being transfered.
On the other hand, in PSE the adversary is B himself, who might try to
deviate from the protocol in order to get A’s secrets without revealing his
own ones.
– In traditional protocols the secrets must remain secret all the time. A and
B always perform the same actions and always want to communicate with
each other.
On the other hand in PSE A shows different behavior when B is honest than
in case of an attempt to cheat. A is willing to reveal his secrets, only when
B wants the same too.
A specification of a protocol shows the correct behavior of the agents. Since
A’s behavior depends on B it makes sense to have different specifications de-
pending on B’s behavior. Since the case where B is honest is trivial, we are
considering the case where B tries to deviate from the protocol. That is B will
try to send some of his bits incorrectly. Moreover the behavior of A depends on
which these bits are. If B stays honest for the first half bits then A will do the
same.
It order to model B’s intention to cheat, we will use a function h : {1..n} 7→
{1..m} that shows on which bit B is going to cheat for each pair. So h(3) = 4
means that B is going to send the 4th bit of (at least) one of the 3rd pair’s
secrets incorrectly. We consider “cheating” to be a deviation from the protocol
in a way that leads to a violation of fairness. Thus, in order for B to cheat h
must be defined on its whole domain. The goal is to exchange just one pair, if
at least one pair is sent correctly by B then fairness is not violated.
The specification is displayed in figure 4. As already discussed, it depends on
B’s cheating behavior, that is on the function h. The specification resembles a
lot the protocol, with two major differences:
1. The specification does not use any of its input (all input variables are re-
placed by x to point out this fact). Moreover bi’s are no longer used (thus
they are removed from the parameter list).
2. The specification does not test the received bits. In the first part, TestOTspec
accepts all messages. In the second, Testspec accepts all bits, except those
on which B is known to cheat, which are accepted only with probability one
half.
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Aspec({aij}i=1..2n,j=1..m , h)
∆
=Qn
i=1 OT
1
2
(〈ai1, . . . , aim〉, 〈a(i+n)1, . . . , a(i+n)m〉, casi ) |
csa1 (x) . . . csan(x).
νq1 . . . νqn+1(q1 ? |
Qn
i=1 qi(x).T estOTspec(i) |
qn+1(x).νs1 . . . νsm+1(s1 ? |Qm
j=1 sj(x).cpa1j . . . . cpa(2n)j .cp(x). . . . cp(x).
νt1 . . . νtn+1(t1 ? |
Qn
i=1 ti(x).T estspec(i, j, h) | tn+1(x).sj+1?) |
sm+1(x).cpok))
TestOTspec(i)
∆
= qi+1?
Testspec(i, j, h)
∆
=

ti+1? +0.5 0 if h(i) = j
ti+1? otherwise
Fig. 4. Specification for the PSE protocol
As a consequence the specification is much simpler than the protocol. As we
will show in the next section, if h is total then A will make n choices and the
probability of succeeding in all of them will be negligible.
4.2 Proving the correctness of PSE
Correctness of the specification. First we show that the specification is indeed
a proper specification for PSE with respect to fairness, in case B tries to cheat.
Let l be the maximum number of bits that B is willing to reveal for its secrets.
So B’s cheating behavior will be described by a function h, such that h(i) ≤ l+1
for all i ∈ {1..n}. This is by definition of PSE, otherwise B would reveal l + 1
bits of at least one pair of secrets and one pair is enough for A.
As we already discussed Aspec does not depend on its input. Moreover it is
deterministic, that is only one transition is possible at any moment, except from
Testspec(i, j, h) for h(i) = j where the process stalls with probability one half.
Since h(i) ≤ l + 1, ∀i ∈ {1..n}, all n of these tests will appear in the first l + 1
steps of the second part of the protocol. If A fails in even one test then he stalls,
so the total probability of advancing to step l +2 and reveal its l +2 pair is 2−n.
This means that Aspec satisfies fairness. If B at some point of the protocol
has l bits of one of A’s pairs, then with probability at least 1− 2−n A will have
l−1 bits of at least one of B’s pairs. If l = m (B has a whole pair) then A should
have at least m− 1 bits and the last bit can be easily computed by trying both
0 and 1. In other words B cannot gain an advantage of more than one bit with
probability greater than 2−n.
Relation between A and Aspec. Having proved the correctness of the specification
with respect to fairness, it remains to show its relation with the original protocol.
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Proving A v Aspec means to prove that if A is vulnerable with high probability to
an attack O, then Aspec will be also vulnerable with at least the same probability.
Since we know that the probability of a successful attack for Aspec is very small,
we can conclude that an attack on A is very unlikely.
Note however that Aspec models the behavior of A only in case of an attack
described by the function h. So A v Aspec cannot hold in general since A will
pass with greater probability a test which models an honest agent. Thus, we
need to use the conditional may-testing defined in section 2.4.
An instance of the specification is a process Aspec put in parallel with servers
for all oblivious transfers:
Ispec(h)
∆
= A({aij}i=1..2n,j=1..m, h) |
n∏
i=1
(S(casi , csbi) | S(cbsi , csai))
Let H be the set of all total functions h : {1..n} 7→ {1..m}. PSE will be considered
correct wrt fairness if:
∀h ∈ H : I vφh Ispec(h)
where φh(O) = true iff ∀i ∈ {1..n} :
O does not contain both bih(i) and b(i+n)h(i)
The condition φh ensures that the test will try to cheat on the h(i)-th bit of each
pair i. The idea is that in order to cheat, an intruder should refuse to send at
least one bit of each message. It can be proved that vφh , for the specific condition
φh described above, is a precongrunce on closed processes wrt the contexts that
satisfy φh. More details can be found in [3].
We can now state the correctness of PSE, as defined above.
Theorem 1. PSE is correct with respect to fairness.
5 Related Work
Security protocols have been extensively studied during the last decade and many
formal methods have been proposed for their analysis. However, the vast majority
of these methods refer to non-deterministic protocols and are not suitable for
the probabilistic setting, since they do not allow to model random choices. One
exception is the work of Aldini and Gorrieri ([2]), where they use a probabilistic
process algebra to analyze fairness in a non-reputation protocol. Their work is
close to ours in spirit, although technically it is quite different. In particular,
we base our analysis on a notion of testing while theirs is based on a notion of
bisimulation.
With respect to the application, the results the most related to ours come
from Norman and Schmatikov ([10], [11]), who use probabilistic model checking
to study fairness in two probabilistic protocols, including the Partial Exchange
Protocol. In particular, in [11] they model the PSE using Prism, a probabilistic
model checker. Their treatment however is very different from ours: their model
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describes only the “correct” behavior for both A and B, as specified by the
protocol. B’s ability to cheat is limited to prematurely stopping the execution,
so attacks in which B deviates completely from the protocol are not taken into
account. Having a simplified model is important in model checking since it helps
overcoming the search state explosion problem, thus making the verification
feasible.
The results in [11] show that with probability one B can gain a one bit
advantage, that is he can get all m bits of a pair of A by revealing only m − 1
bits of his. This is achieved simply by stopping the execution after receiving the
last bit from A. Moreover a method of overcoming the problem is proposed, which
gives this advantage to A or B, each with probability one half. Is is worth noting
that this is a very weak form of attack and could be considered as negligible,
since A can compute the last bit very easily by trying both 0 and 1. Besides a
one bit advantage will always exist in contract signing protocols, simply because
synchronous communication is not feasible.
In our approach, by modeling an adversary as an arbitrary piprob process
we allow him to perform a vast range of attacks including sending messages,
performing calculations, monitoring public channels etc. Our analysis shows not
only that a one bit attack is possible, but more important that no attack to
obtain an advantage of two or more bits exists with non-negligible probability.
Moreover our method has the advantage of being easily extendable. For example,
treating more sessions, even an infinite number of ones, can be done by putting
many copies of the processes in parallel.
Of course, the major advantage of the model checking approach, with respect
to ours, is that it can be totally automated.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we examined a method to analyze probabilistic security protocols
using process calculi. The main tool for this analysis is the piprob-calculus, a prob-
abilistic variant of the pi-calculus. The probabilistic choice, provided by piprob,
allowed us to encode the Partial Exchange Protocol, a probabilistic protocol
based on the Oblivious Transfer. In order to prove the correctness of this pro-
tocol, we defined various preorders between piprob processes and examined their
properties. Then we presented a properly constructed specification and showed
that it is stronger than the original protocol, thus proving that the possibility
of success for any attack is very small.
Our results show that process calculi techniques can be successfully applied to
security protocol analysis. There are various advantages of this approach. First of
all the use of process calculi allows the use of various tools from the corresponding
theory. The proofs obtained are general, covering every possible adversary and
are not instance-based as in model checking techniques. Moreover process calculi
allow the analysis of a protocol in a more complex environment, having for
example many agents and multiple simultaneous instances of a protocol. It is
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worth noting that many attacks of well known protocols only appear in such
situations.
In [4] an algorithm for deciding may-testing is presented, for fully probabilis-
tic automata. We believe that this result can be extended to the probabilistic
automata defined in section 1.2, giving the ability of automatically proving the
correctness of probabilistic security protocols.
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